

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8079

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 2132

EXDIS

E. O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REP MARCH 18

FROM US MBFR REP

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. ON MARCH 18 US REP MET FOR TALK WITH SOVIET REP KVITSINSKIY AT THE LATTER' S REQUEST. DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE HUNGARINA ISSUE. KVITSINSKIY REPEATEDLY STATED HIS CONVICTION THAT ALLIED ABEYANCE FORMULA WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED IN ANY OF ITS VARIANTS. AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION, HE PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF INSERTING IN THE PROCEDURES PAPER A GENERAL PHRASE STATING THAT OTHER STATES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO JOINT THE GROUP OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON INVITATION OF THE LATTER, OF PUTTING HUNGARY IN GROUP OF SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS AND OF POSSIBLY ADDING TO THIS PACKAGE UNILATERAL INTERPRETIVE STATEMENTS BY HUNGARY AND THE ALLIES. END SUMMARY.

2. KVITSINSKIY BEGAN THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET ANY MENTION OF HUNGARY IN A WAY WHICH WOULD SINGLE IT OUT ACCEPTED IN MOSCOW. HE HAD ONE MORE DISCUSSED THE MATTER ON THE PHONE WITH MOSCOW EARLIER THAT DAY AND HAD ONCE AGAIN RECEIVED THE SAME REPLY. MOREOVER, THE POLITBURO OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY HAD PASSED A FORMAL RESOLUTION THAT HUNGARY COULD NOT COME IN UNLESS ITALY CAME IN AND SUCH FOR-
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MAL DECISIONS OF THIS KIND COULD NOT BE CHANGED WITHOUT A TOTAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE HAD NOT YET SENT A WRITTEN VERSION OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL TO MOSCOW BECAUSE IF HE DID SO, THIS WOULD UNQUESTIONABLY ELICIT A FORMAL NEGATIVE RESPONSE WHICH WOULD BE BINDING ON KHLESTOV AND HIMSELF AND CUT OFF ALL FURTHER DISCUSSION ON A NON-COMMITTED BASIS.

3. US REP SAID IT SHOULD BE ENOUGH FOR SOVIETS AND MEET BOTH SOVIET AND HUNGARIAN INTERESTS THAT HUNGARY NO LONGER APPEARED AS A DIRECT PARTICIPANT. THE SOLUTION THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED WOULD LEAVE OPEN THE DISCUSSION OF HUNGARY DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AS IT WOULD BE IN ANY CASE. TO ASK MORE WOULD BE UNREASONABLE.

4. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE ABSOLUTELY COULD NOT GET THROUGH A PRESUMED RESOLUTION WHICH SINGLED OUT HUNGARY AND LEFT THE ISSUE COMPLETELY OPEN. HE THEN PROPOSED THAT A GENERAL PARAGRAPH BE ADDED FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE PAPER OF FEBRUARY 9 TO THE EFFECT THAT OTHER COUNTRIES COULD AT THEIR OWN DESIRE AND AT THEIR OWN REQUEST OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, PARTICIPATE IN DECISIONS OR AGREEMENTS. KVITSINSKIY SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIETS IN THIS WAY TO CREATE AND RETAIN AN OPENING FOR THE INCLUSION OF FRANCE. HE ASKED US REP WHETHER THERE WAS ANY NEW DEVELOPMENT IN THE FRENCH POSITION ON MBFR OF WHICH HE WAS AWARE. AMB. ABRASIMOV HAD RECENTLY TRIED AGAIN IN PARIS AND HAD BEEN REBUFFED ONCE MORE. US REP SAID HE HAD HEARD NOTHING OF ANY CHANGE IN THE FRENCH POSITION. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY SIMPLY COULDN'T UNDERSTAND THE OVERALL FRENCH CONCEPTION OF THEIR ROLE IN THE WORLD. THE FRENCH WERE VERY FRUSTRATING AND HARD TO DEAL WITH.

5. US REP ASKED KVITSINSKIY ABOUT HIS OWN REMARKS OF MARCH 14 CONCERNING MEASURES WHICH WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO HUNGARY AND ITALY, A PROPOSAL APPARENTLY ORIGINATED BY COL. KAPITONOV. KVITSINSKIY THEN PROCEEDED TO FALL BACK FROM HIS PREVIOUS REMARKS. HE SAID HE HAD REALLY MEANT NOT ONLY THAT ANY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT APPLY SHOULD APPLY TO BOTH COUNTRIES TO

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THE SAME EXTENT, BUT ALSO THAT THEY SHOULD INVOLVE EQUAL SACRIFICE ON BOTH SIDES. HE SAID SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY WERE VERY IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIET UNION POLITICALLY IN THE EVENT OF DIFFICULTIES IN ROMANIA OR YUGOSLAVIA. WHO KNEW WHAT THE FUTURE WOULD BRING IN THIS AREA? US REP REFERRED TO KAPITONOV' S REMARKS TO COL. CLAR. KVITSINSKIY SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER IN DEPTH WITH KAPITONOV AND THAT KAPITONOV DENIED EVER HAVING MADE THE PROPOSAL REPORTED BY COL. CLARK TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE COULD BE AGREEMENT NOT TO INCREASE FOREIGN FORCES IN HUNGARY IF THE ALLIES WOULD UNDERTAKE A SIMILAR COMMITMENT WITH REGARD TO ITALY. COL. CLARK MUST HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD.

6. US REP SAID HE FOUND KVITSINSKIY' S REMARKS INTERESTED IF INCOMPLETE, BUT AS HE HAD SAID BEFORE, HE DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE PRESENT STAGE WAS A SUITABLE TIME TO DEAL WITH ISSUES OF THIS KIND SO HE WOULD NOT PURSUE IT FURTHER. KVITSINSKIY SAID THE ISSUE OF TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SETTLED BETWEEN THE US AND USSR BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS. OTHERWISE, THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE A WRANGLE ABOUT HUNGARY.

7. US REP SAID THAT KVITSINSKIY' S FORMULA ABOUT ADDING ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES MIGHT BE ALL RIGHT IF THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION WERE STILL LEFT OPEN. OTHERWISE THE NET GAIN OF PUTTING THIS CONCEPT INTO THE PAPER WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIETS BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN INTEREST IN BRINGING IN FRANCE. THE ALLIES HAD ALREADY MADE THE POTENTIAL CONCESSION OF DROPPING HUNGARY FROM THE LIST OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND IF WE WANTED TO DISAGREE, PERHAPS WE SHOULD HAVE TWO CONFLICTING STATEMENTS TO INDICATE THIS INCLUDED IN THE PROCEEDURES PAPER. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE DID NOT OBJECT TO CONFLICTING STATEMENTS, BUT THEY COULD NOT MENTION HUNGARY ALONE. THEY WOULD HAVE TO MENTION ITALY TOO.

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8. KVITSINSKIY THEN COMPLAINED ABOUT THE UNRULINESS OF THE US ALLIES AND THEIR LACK OF COHESION AROUND THE US POSITION. THE ALLIES SEEMED TO SPEND MOST OF THEIR TIME SANDBAGGING THE ENTIRE CONCEPT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHY DID NOT THE US KNOCK A FEW HEADS TOGETHER AND GET SOME SENSE IN THEM? AFTER ALL, WHAT WAS INVOLVED IN THE ENTIRE ENTERPRISE, AS FAR AS HE COULD SEE, WAS ONLY A CUT OF 10-15 PERCENT IN EXISTING FORCES. THIS WOULD BE WORTHWHILE, BUT IT WOULD NOT BE EARTHSHAKING. THE MATTER SHOULD NOT BE OVER DRAMATIZED. THE US ALLIES WOULD SEE THE US VIEWPOINT IF IT WERE REALLY MADE CLEAR TO THEM. WHEN THE SOVIET UNION HAD PROBLEMS LIKE THIS, IT BROUGHT THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF ALL THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED TOGETHER AND THE MATTER WAS CLEARED UP IN NO TIME. IF THESE ISSUES WERE LEFT TO OFFICIALS, THEY ALWAYS FOUND REASONS NOT TO DO SOMETHING. US REP SAID THAT, AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD KVITSINSKIY, US HAD DIFFERENT RELATIONSHIP TO ITS ALLIES THAN USSR WITH EASTERN EUROPEANS. USSR WAS NOT ALWAYS SUCCESSFUL IN ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS OWN ALLIES, AND HAD MORE THAN ONCE HAD TO RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE, SURELY AN INDICATION OF FAILURE. KVITSINSKIY SAID WITH GRIN THAT THESE WERE TYPICAL PROBLEMS OF A GREAT POWER AND THE US MIGHT HAVE THEM WITH ITS OWN ALLIES SOME DAY. AFTER ALL, THE US HAD USED THESE METHODS IN LATIN AMERICA OVER THE PAST CENTURY.

9. KVITSINSKIY THEN MENTIONED THE EMERGING US RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. HE DWELT AT LENGTH ON THE XENOPHOBIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHINESE AND SAID THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH THE CHINESE HAD OBLIGED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO ABANDON DEFINITELY THE THEORY THAT ADHERENCE TO A COMMON IDEOLOGY WOULD OVERCOME THE CENTRIFUGAL FORCES OF NATIONALISM. NOTHING COULD OVERCOME THESE FORCES IN CHINA. HE INDICATED A BELIEF THE US WOULD DO NO BETTER THAN THE SOVIET UNION AS REGARDSC CHINA.

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10. US REP RETURNED TO QUESTION OF THE PROCEDURES PAPER. HE SAID KVITSINSKIY'S PROPOSALS THUS FAR WERE INADEQUATE. COULD HE THINK OF ANYTHING ELSE WHICH MIGHT MAKE HIS CONCEPT ACCEPTABLE? KVITSINSKIY SAID PERHAPS THERE MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN WRITING UNILATERAL STATEMENTS FROM THE ALLIES GIVING THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HUNGARY'S STATUS AS A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT AND PERHAPS A UNILATERAL STATEMENT FROM HUNGARY INDICATING THAT IT MIGHT JOIN THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IF THE CONDITIONS WERE RIGHT. US REP SAID HE THOUGHT ALL OF THIS WOULD BE TOO LITTLE FOR THE ALLIES TO ACCEPT. THEY HAD MADE THEIR BASIC CONCESSION AND THE SOVIETS SHOULD AGREE TO MOVING AHEAD ON THIS BASIS. KVITSINSKIY SAID THAT NONETHELESS HE WOULD PROBABLY BRING UPP SOME OF THESE IDEAS IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNGARIAN AND NETHERLANDS REPS.

11. KVITSINSKIY RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE FORMULA IDENTIFYING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN AGREEMENTS. US REP SAID THERE MIGHT BE SOME RESISTANCE ON PART OF SOME ALLIES TO UNDERTAKE WHAT COULD APPEAR AS ADVANCE COMMITMENT. KVITSINSKIY SAID IN THAT EVENT, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REPLACE THE WORD " AGREEMENTS" WITH A WORD LIKE " MEASURES," BUT SOMETHING WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WERE IN FACT REAL MEMBERS OF THE ENTERPRISE.

12. KVITSINSKIY SPOKE FOR THE FIRST TIME OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A RECESS IN THE TALKS IF IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO REVOLVE THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION, BUT DID NOT PRESS THIS POINT. HE SAID HE NOW INTENDED TO RENT AN APART-
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MENT IN VIENNA (KHLESTOV ALREADY HAS ONE) AND TO BRING HIS WIFE HERE. HE SAID HIS PROMOTION TO THE RANK OF MINISTER, WHICH HAD COME THROUGH TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY, HAD BEEN ON ACCOUNT OF HIS WORK IN THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS.

13. COMMENT: KVITSINSKIY'S REMARKS INDICATE THAT THE OUTLINES OF A SOVIET COUNTER- PROPOSAL TO THE ALLIED PROPOSAL ON LEAVING HUNGARY IN ABEYANCE ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE AND THAT THAT COUNTER- PROPOSAL APPEARS TO BE WITHIN THE GENERAL LINES OF THE US FALL- BACK POSITION. IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT EAST- WEST DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC, IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT WHILE ALLIED REPS WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD TO THEIR HUNGARIAN ABEYANCE PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS MAY BUILD UP THEIR COUNTER- PROPOSAL PIECE BY PIECE. A POSSIBLE OUTCOME IN THE

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